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Yezidis : Ethnic, national or religious?

PostPosted: Sat Feb 04, 2006 4:36 pm
by Ardavan
Yezidi identity in the last century: Ethnic, national or religious?
Source : kurdish info

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The aim of this paper is to explore how identity and ethnicity as distinct from other groups in the area has been seen by Yezidi Kurds throughout the last century. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the division of its lands into a number of countries where Yezidis live there have been many political and social changes which have had direct impact on the lives of the community, and the ways they practice and express their faith. Lalash and Jayia shangar where I spend some days to do filed work and document what you read .

In Iraq, the birth place of Yezidism, where current religious leaders and pilgrim sites are based, Yezidis have been forced to show their loyalty and acceptance of the government’s political demands to form a sort of coalition with the central government. After the fall of Saddam once again the Yezidis have changed their sense of affiliation, and now publicly announce that they are of Kurdish descent.

There have been seventy two genocides ordered by the Muslim rulers in the past, before the fall of the Ottomans, in order to wipe out the Yezidi community, who were often viewed as devil worshipers. After the creation of the modern states in the Middle East, these practices stopped. Therefore, Yezidis viewed the creation of these nation states, unlike their fellow Kurds or ethnically oriented minorities, as bringing a sense of security for their religious rights. It is true that these developments served to protect them from local warlords and Muslim rulers. Also, the political situation and the centralised government created opportunities in which the Yezidis began to freely express their religious ceremonies in terms of Haj and large annual gatherings attended by thousands. The government even assisted with this, allowing Yezidis to build shrines and pilgrim sites in Sanjar, a place called Lalash where the teaching of Yezidi religion takes place. The physical isolation of the place, along with its ritual significance, has helped the Yezidi communities there to develop a sense of identity separate from their neighbours which is also acceptable for the regimes in power.

Yezidi Kurds from Iraq are mostly based in an area call Jayi Sanjar (Sanjar Mountain) which was the battle ground in the war between Kurdish militias and the Iraqi regime in the past. Yezidis were in a perfect position to be manipulated in a ‘divide and rule’ approach to maintaining power in the area. Throughout the recent historical eras since the fall of the Ottomans, the Yezidi community has kept itself closely aligned with the changing powers in the area, Arab or Kurdish, and regardless of their particular focus on religion in the public domain. This strategy has enabled them to survive as a coherent and bounded group, and kept them safe from local religious antagonisms.(Fuccuro,1997:565) As Islam is the predominant religion in the countries where Yezidis reside and practise, the hostility between Yezidi and Muslim communities discouraged Yezidis from engaging with surrounding social and political developments. This has meant the community largely maintained traditional tribal structures, and in terms of education for example, they remain largely illiterate. As the schools did not allowed the religion of Yezidi thought into the curriculum, communities have often responded by not sending their children to schools. Endogamy is practised by these Yezidi communities, and intermarriage with any one out side yezidi religion is strictly forbidden. On occasions, acting in contradiction to this has even carried death orders from the Yezidi religious leadership.

Given the religious differences between Yezidi Kurds and other Muslim Kurds, which worked to their advantage, the government started by ‘Arabising’ the Yezidi Kurds, encouraging them to change their identity on their Iraqi ID cards from Kurdish to Arab ethnicity. Their religious book was published in Arabic, and their religious leader offered a seat in the Iraqi National Parliament. As well, financial development grants have been offered to the area in a bid to ensure the loyalty of the Yezidi Kurds to the government.

After the fall of Saddam, past developments with respect to Yezidis which had taken place under his regime began to unravel. The Yezidis begun to reinvent themselves as Kurds, to the extent that changes to their formal dress code (which used to be Arabic in style) in a Kurdish style have begun in a few short years. Also, their religious books are now printed in Kurdish by the Iraqi Kurdish authorities, and the community has now been giving special treatment socially and politically by the new regime.

Cohen, in Two-Dimensional Man talks about the power order and the symbolic order as interdependent, and points out that this symbiotic nature has often been overlooked by wider social and political science. His explanation suggests that power and symbolism function together to maintain social institutions, and that adaptations in either system can be affected by changes in the other. (Cohen, 1974:23-24)

In the case of the Yezidi community in Iraq, we in fact see that there is a close parallel between political events and the ways their ritual and symbolic order respond or adapt to wider political events. Their position of privilege has always been maintained by a creative manipulation of religious identity, by aligning it at times with Arab leadership, at times with Kurdish ethnicity. Therefore, by creating a distinct boundary of “Yezidi identity” they can operate in relation to the changing power order regardless of who fills the role of Iraqi leadership.

Political powers, the economic and political, are indistinguishable one from the other. They certainly differ in a number of respects. The relationships which they govern are formally regulated by different mechanisms. Political power is ultimately maintained by physical coercion. Economic power is ultimately maintained by reward and deprivation.

Similarly, the institutions of kinship and ritual, though distinct in form, have a great deal in common, and the separation between them is often arbitrary and sometimes misleading. They are both normative, governed by categorical imperatives, or ‘oughts’ that are rooted in the psychic structure of men in society through continuous socialisation.

Cohen’s discussion of the relationship between the ‘two dimensions’ can be a useful tool in looking at the case of the Yezidis. Throughout the last century, Yezidis have not been a politically oriented community, and traditionally kept distance from active political participation. At the same time, they have been present in the political arena by using their alignments to gain privilege, siding with those who were in power. While there has been number of political changes and shifts of power in the area, the Yezidis have maintained they loyalty to the power order. In this way, their symbolic systems have always remained relevant and powerful as a source of identity to the Yezidi population, while being adapted as a useful political resource in managing relations with other power groups.

Emile Durkheim, on the other hand, says that church members (who here we can understand as any religiously based community), find
“…the beliefs and practices of his religious life ready-made at birth; their existence prior to his own implies their existence outside of hime self. The system of signs I use to express my thought, the system of currency I employ to pay my debts, the instruments of credit I utilize in my commercial relations, the practices followed in my profession, etc function independently of my own use of them”. (Durkheim 1909:85)

Durkheim argues that social facts are real because their effects can be felt. People are compelled to live according the rules of their society and violate them at their peril. While Cohen’s ideas about the power order and politics suggest that they always work together, Durkheim’s ideas seems to view religion as fixed in society, and not necessarily associated with other aspects of life. Looking at the case of Yezidis in present day Iraq, we see that while the image of this community is one of isolation and cultural distinctness, they have also adapted to changing social and political situations. Yezidi identity has even been used as a way to maintain good relations with those in power. This can be observed in material culture as much as beliefs, as in the example of the changes to religious texts and dress codes of contemporary Yezidis. We might say that from the perspective of the Yezidis themselves, Durkhiem’s ideas seem most accurate, however if we look at things from an external perspective, we see that the close interaction between power order and behaviours surrounding religious practice illustrates Cohen’s ideas about the ‘two dimensions’ of man. Each act and belief is a political one and a symbolic one.

PostPosted: Sat Feb 04, 2006 4:40 pm
by Ardavan
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See this page : http://kurdishinfo.com/NEWROZ-2005/newroz.html

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PKK Militants Surprising Survey Outcome: PKK’s giving up hop

PostPosted: Sat Feb 11, 2006 11:52 pm
by babak
I found the following article interesting even if I don't agree with it. It's taken from a Turkish website which tries to deny Kurdish identity. But it's worthy to read because we learn that PKK movement places Zoroaster as its religious leader.

Source: Journal of Turkish Weekly

PKK Militants Surprising Survey Outcome: PKK’s giving up hopes from Kurds

Emre Ozkan

In the beginning of February, Journal of Turkish Weekly made a comprehensive analysis about a surprising survey which was made among 300 PKK militants. “Firat News Agency”, known as the pro-PKK (ethnic terror organization, Kurdistan Workers Party) news agency, made the survey, and it was published by “Ulkede Ozgur Gundem” at the end of the January. These militants were asked several questions such as their religious preferences, historic idols and reading habits. In this context, the survey results are surprising and remarkable that the preferences of PKK militants about religious leaders, historical idols and reading habits are very different from people who live in the region that PKK actively involves.

In this survey, the most remarkable result is the view of militants about religious leaders. The militants have answers which can be considered as unusual in this regards. Most of them see the Zoroastra (34%) and Jesus (34%) as the most favorable religious leader. The other militants accept Mani, Muhammed, Moses and Abraham prophets as a religious leader with the percentage of 11%, 10 %, 7% and 4% respectively. When it is considered the Islam as the mostly accepted religion (99%) in the Kurdish populated area, it can be concluded that there are huge gaps between the people in Southern East of the Anatolian Region and the people who allege to represent the people in that region. The Kurdish people have a high religious sensitivity and high respect to fundamental principles to Islam religion, in contrast to this, these militants have a remarkable lack of sensitivity to the Islamic principles, which is ironical.

After having published the survey, several reactions observed from different sides of the society and academic world about the intention of publishing the survey and its outcomes.

In this framework, according to Dr. Ihsan Bal, Head of Security and Terrorism Studies in ISRO (International Strategic Research Organization), publishing the results of the survey by a pro-PKK news agency may have two dimensions. The first is to send massages to Christian world. Because the PKK has had an external support, this survey can be evaluated as a message to the outside as Christian figure Jesus in the survey results has higher percentage than the Islamic religion prophet, Muhammed. Besides, when it is included that Syrian and Armenian people had an active participation in the activities of the PKK, this terrorist organization may have the intention to turn back to its origins. According to him, the second dimension can be based on the Marxist-Leninist origins of the PKK. When it is thought about the origins of the PKK, Zoroastra and Mani chosen as religious leaders can be interpreted as the intention of PKK’s turning back to its origins.

Ihsan Bal mentions that PKK is not a religious originated organization. So these survey’s answers cannot give any hints whether the PKK has a religious origin. Furthermore, the answers about the question of religious leader cannot overlap with the religious view of the region in which PKK fulfills their activities. If it is considered that the PKK is active especially in , and triangle, the survey will show that the religious preferences of the leaders of the organization belong to marginal groups in the region.

Moreover Talat Salk, Head of Law Studies in ISRO, pointed out that PKK added the religious dimension to its activities afterwards. With emphasizing the religious views, PKK may want to do its propaganda widely. And they may intent to give a political message by this survey.

When analyzing the results of the survey it is possible to find different aspects. As Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin Erol, expert of Turkish Foreign Policy in ASAM ( Eurasia Strategic Research Center ), argues that the knowledge level of the militants is insufficient to answer the questions of survey consistently. What’s more, Erol also mentions the Israel-Mossad influence on the region and concludes that the region may enter the influence of outsiders.

In addition to these arguments, Dr. Nihat Ali Özcan, expert on ethnic terrorism, mentions that the results of the survey are not surprising. He emphasizes the usage of Zoroastrian values in the construction of Kurdish identity. So, the leading answer of Zoroastra as a religious leader among the PKK militants has to be evaluated as normal.

On the other hand, Abdulmelik Firat, head of the Rights and Freedoms Party (HAK-PAR), emphasizes an important aspect. According to him, the survey proofs that PKK does not represent Kurdish people. He also accentuates that Kurdish people are Muslim. So the views of PKK militants which see the Zoroastra as a religious leader have no relationship with the Kurdish people.

In addition to this, the survey includes other preferences of the militants about different fields. According to the survey the militant’s most favorite military personality in the history is Mahsun Korkmaz who was one of the leading figures of the terrorist organization and did raid to Eruh in 1984. The other favorite personalities are Alexander the Great and Napoleon. And most favorite mythological characters are Gilgamesh, Prometheus and Hector randomly. These preferences also reveal the broken ties of the militants from the preferences of the people living in the Kurdish populated region.

As a conclusion, this survey shows us two important possibilities: First one is that PKK may have the intention to turn back to its origins. At first, as argued above, PKK had a Marxist- Leninist ideology. So, the preferences of Zoroastra and Mani can be based to this origin of PKK. The second possibility is that with this survey PKK may send a message to outside of . Since the beginning of its establishment, PKK enjoys foreign support. Meanwhile, secret Armenian involvement with the PKK became apparent and evident as the survey highlighted that the most of the PKK militants have similar idols to Armenians rather than Kurds. So, the higher percentage of Christianity, Zoroastrianism and Manism rather than Islam supports the views that PKK is trying to escape from the regional policy for its survival. In other words, it is very obvious that the preferences of PKK militants about religious leaders, historical idols and reading habits are very different from people who live in the region that PKK actively involves. So, this ethnic terror organization, PKK, does not represent the Kurdish people whom PKK allege to represent.